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Notes and Comments
Making Waves In Statutory Safe
Harbors: Reevaluating Internet
Service Providers' Liability for
Third-Party Content and
Copyright Infringement
With the growth of the Internet" as a medium of communica-
tion, the appropriate standard of liability for access providers has
emerged as an international legal debate.2 Internet Service Prov-
iders (ISPs) 3 have faced, and continue to face, potential liability for
the acts of individuals using their services to access, post, or
download information.4 Two areas of law where this potential lia-
bility has been discussed extensively are defamation and copyright
law.5
In the United States, ISP liability for the content of third-
party postings has been dramatically limited by the Communica-
tions Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). 6 However, ISPs in America do
not face the same degree of immunity for third-party acts of copy-
1. See generally Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-51
(1997) (describing the development and operation of the Internet).
2. See generally Rosa Julia-Barcelo, Liability for On-Line Intermediaries: A
European Perspective, 1998 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 20(12) 453-63 (describing the
issue of ISP liability and its dimensions).
3. See Mitchell P. Goldstein, Service Provider Liability for Acts Committed by
Users: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L.
591, 592 n.1 (2000) (describing Internet service providers as computer systems pro-
viding individuals with modem access to the Internet).
4. See Julia-Barcelo, supra note 2, at 453.
5. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1367 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
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right infringement.7 Under the Online Copyright Infringement Li-
ability Limitation Act (OCILLA), Title II of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), 8 Internet service providers are protected
from strict liability for third-party acts of copyright infringement
only if they can prove that their activities fit into one of four gen-
eral safe harbor categories: transitory network communications,
system caching, information stored on networks under user direc-
tion, and information location tools.9 To retain this safe harbor im-
munity, OCILLA also requires an ISP to promptly remove any
allegedly infringing materials stored on its service once it has been
notified of their unauthorized use by a copyright holder.10
In contrast to the United States, the European Union (EU) is
in the process of developing a unified standard for determining the
extent of ISP liability for the acts of their third-party users.1 The
new EU E-Commerce Directive 12 addresses these issues, and cre-
ates safe harbor provisions for ISPs that are, for the most part,' 3
very similar to those enforced in the United States by the DMCA.14
The E-Commerce Directive and the DMCA differ in the scope of
their liability limitations. The Directive is designed to regulate all
instances of ISP liability for the acts of its third-party users, and
applies one standard horizontally to all areas of law, 15 including
defamation and copyright infringement. This is unlike the vertical
approach to ISP liability taken in the United States, where liabil-
ity limitations for Internet providers are defined according to the
area of law in which the offense occurs.16 While the safe harbor
7. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 638.
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1332 (Supp. IV 1998). Title II of the DMCA is entitled
the Online Copyright Infringement Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV 1998).
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d), (f), (g), (i).
10. See id.
11. See Rosa Julia-Barcelo, On-Line Intermediary Liability Issues: Comparing
E.U. and U.S. Legal Frameworks, 2000 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 22(3) 105-19.
12. See Proposal for a Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Com-
merce in the Internal Market, COM (98) 586 final; Directive on Certain Legal As-
pects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the
Internal Market, Council Directive 00/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) [hereinafter EU E-
Commerce Directive].
13. The EU E-Commerce Directive does not include a safe harbor for informa-
tion location tools, which is present in the DMCA. See id.; see also Julia-Barcelo,
supra note 11, at 114.
14. See Julia-Barcelo supra note 11, at 108.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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provisions limiting ISP liability for user acts of copyright infringe-
ment will be similar in the United States and the EU following the
adoption of the Directive,17 the safe harbor provisions limiting ISP
liability for third-party content will differ dramatically.' 8 By ap-
plying the safe harbors of the E-Commerce Directive horizontally,
the EU will look to these same provisions in determining when an
ISP can face liability as the publisher or distributor of a user's de-
famatory statement.' 9 In the United States, an ISP holds blanket
immunity from being considered the publisher of a third-party de-
famatory statement under the CDA.20
This paper will first discuss the development of the CDA and
its requisite safe harbor provision limiting the liability of ISPs for
defamatory content on their systems posted by third parties.2' It
will next discuss the liability of ISPs for third-party copyright in-
fringement under the safe harbor provisions provided by the
DMCA in OCILLA.22 It will then compare the liability limitations
of the DMCA to those included in the European Union E-Com-
merce Directive,23 and outline the implications of applying the
same safe harbor limitations horizontally to include ISP liability
under defamation law within the same safe harbor parameters.
This paper will conclude that the DMCA's safe harbor provisions
limiting ISP copyright liability for third-party infringement as out-
lined should be applied horizontally in defamation cases to deter-
mine whether an ISP can be held liable as the publisher or
distributor of a third-party defamatory statement posted on its ser-
vice. Finally, this paper will consider the First Amendment con-
cerns arising from the required removal provisions of the DMCA,24
and how these provisions could be limited in a defamation context
so as not to improperly impede these rights.
17. See generally id. (comparing the EU E-Commerce Directive to the safe
harbor provisions of the DMCA and concluding that they are largely similar).
18. See id. at 108.
19. See id.
20. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 638.
21. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
22. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1332 (Supp. TV 1998).
23. See Council Directive 2000/31/EC 2000 O.J. (L 178); see also Julia-Barcelo,
supra note 2.
24. See generally Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Sub-
scriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88
Geo. L.J. 1833 (2000) (discussing the First Amendment's under-emphasized impli-
cations on copyright law).
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I. ISP LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY ACTS OF DEFAMATION
At common law one who "repeats" the statements of another is
just as responsible for their defamatory content as the original
speaker.25 Thus, the publisher of a defamatory statement is
equally liable to the defamed party as is the person originally mak-
ing the statement. However, newsvendors, bookstores, libraries,
and other vendors and distributors of defamatory publications are
not liable if they did not know or have reason to know of the defa-
mation. 26 Freedom of speech and the press prevent the govern-
ment from imposing strict liability on distributors for the content
of materials they carry.27 Therefore, in the quest to avoid liability
for the content placed on the Internet by third-party subscribers, it
is advantageous under a common law regime for an ISP to be char-
acterized as a distributor rather than a publisher of an allegedly
defamatory statement.
A. ISP Liability for Third-Party User Defamation Before the
CDA
The first time that the question of liability for an ISP arose in
an American defamation case was in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe,
Inc.28 In this case, CompuServe, an Internet service provider, op-
erated a bulletin board that contained a daily newsletter publica-
tion catering to the journalistic community entitled "Rumorville."29
Cubby, Inc. began a competing electronic publication entitled
"Skuttlebut."30 Following the publication of Skuttlebut, the
Rumorville newsletter published statements claiming Skuttlebut
was publishing information that it obtained through a "back door"
that had first been published by Rumorville, that its principal had
been "bounced" from his prior job, and characterizing Skuttlebut as
a "start-up scam." 31 Cubby then sued CompuServe as the pub-
lisher of these defamatory statements.
25. See Cinanci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1980).
26. See Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
27. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959).
28. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
29. See id. at 135.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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The court held that CompuServe acted as a distributor of the
Rumorville newsletter rather than its publisher 32 This holding
was based on the court's finding that CompuServe did not exercise
editorial control over the Journalism Forum bulletin board, but
rather had contracted with an independent company, Cameron
Communications, Inc., to "manage, review, create, delete, edit and
otherwise control [its] contents" in accordance with the editorial
and technical standards of CompuServe. 33 Further, the court
found that Rumorville was published by Don Fitzpatrick Associ-
ates, who accepted total responsibility for its contents. 34 Com-
puServe's only activity in managing the bulletin board was
requiring Cameron Communications to limit access to Rumorville
to those CompuServe subscribers having a membership arrange-
ment with Don Fitzpatrick.35 Since CompuServe had "no opportu-
nity to review" the content of the newsletter before it was uploaded
and made available to subscribers, the court found that Com-
puServe exercised no more editorial control over Rumorville "than
does a public library, bookstore or newsstand" over material it
makes available to the public.36 The court went on to hold that the
proper standard of liability to be applied to CompuServe in this
case was whether it, as a distributor of Rumorville, "knew or had
reason to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville state-
ments."37 Since Cubby offered no evidence that CompuServe knew
or had reason to know of the statements at issue, the court refused
to hold CompuServe liable for their content. 38
Cubby's holding was not followed by a later case, Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. 3 9 In this case, an anony-
mous user of Prodigy's "Money Talk" bulletin board posted state-
ments claiming that Stratton Oakmont, a securities investment
banking firm, and Daniel Porush, Stratton's president, committed
criminal and fraudulent acts and was a "cult of brokers who either
32. See id. at 140.
33. Id.
34. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 140-41.
38. See id. at 141.
39. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., Co., 1995 WL 323710 at *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
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lie for a living or get fired."4° Unlike, the decision in Cubby, the
court in Stratton Oakmont held that Prodigy could be held liable
for libel as if it were a newspaper or broadcaster because it re-
served the right to exercise editorial control over its electronic bul-
letin boards.41 The court reasoned that Prodigy held itself out to
the public as an ISP exercising editorial control over its bulletin
board postings.42 Prodigy employed both an automatic screening
software program and volunteer bulletin board leaders to super-
vise the content of board submissions.43 The Stratton Oakmont
court likened these features to the editorial control exercised by a
newspaper, and held that Prodigy was a publisher of the defama-
tory statements at issue, even though the ISP had no knowledge of
these statements."
The court in Stratton Oakmont distinguished the Cubby deci-
sion by describing the different roles performed by CompuServe
and Prodigy, the two ISPs and bulletin board operators in ques-
tion. The court acknowledged that a mere distributor, such as a
bookstore or library, may be liable for a defamatory statement
made by a third party only if it knew or had reason to know of the
defamatory statement at issue. 45 A distributor, such as Com-
puServe in Cubby, acts as a passive conduit and will not be found
liable for libel in absence of fault.4 The court reasoned that Prod-
igy was not such a passive conduit because it exercised editorial
control over its bulletin board postings equivalent to that of a
newspaper editor.47 By exercising this editorial control, the court
found that Prodigy exposed itself to greater liability than other
computer networks choosing not to monitor the content of their
system.48
40. Id.
41. See id. at *5.
42. See id. at *2.
43. See id. at *4.
44. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 at *3.
45. See id. at *3.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at *5.
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B. Congressional Reaction to Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy
Services Co.: The CDA
In response to the decision in Stratton Oakmont, Congress
passed Section 230 of the Consumer Decency Act of 1996.49 In this
section, Congress provided that online service providers and web
site owners be regarded as distributors rather than publishers of
third-party content posted on their systems.50 Congress adopted
this section with the intention of removing the heightened liability
Stratton Oakmont placed on ISPs who choose to monitor the con-
tent posted on their systems that was generated by other, third-
party providers. 51 Section 230 also limits the liability of an online
provider for any action taken voluntarily by the ISP in "good faith"
to restrict access to material "that the provider or user considers to
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing,
or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is consti-
tutionally protected."52 These provisions were enacted to facilitate
Congress' larger goal of "removing disincentives for the develop-
ment and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies" which
allow parents to "restrict their children's access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material."53
Although portions of the CDA prohibiting the transmission of
"obscene or indecent" communications were held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,54
the provisions limiting ISP liability for third-party content remain
viable. 55 While the language of Section 230 clearly limits the lia-
bility ISPs face as publishers of third-party content, it does not di-
rectly address the remaining liability that ISPs could potentially
incur as distributors of third-party defamation when the required
49. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
50. 47 U.S.C § 230(c)(1) provides: "No provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information pro-
vided by another information content provider."
51. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Congressional Conference Com-
mittee, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
52. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (1996).
53. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (1996).
54. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
55. See id; see also Goldstein, supra note 3, at 617-21 (discussing the limita-
tions of the Reno case on the CDA and the continuing viability of Section 230 as it
limits the content liability of ISPs).
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knowledge standard is proven in court.56 However, in applying the
CDA to online defamation cases, the courts have declined to draw a
distinction between distributors and publishers in a way that
would give rise to ISP liability for third-party content. 57 In fact, as
this paper will now discuss, courts have interpreted the CDA as
providing ISPs a complete safe harbor from tort liability for third-
party content posted on their services, even when the provider does
not employ any of the self-monitoring activities Congress hoped to
promote in enacting the CDA. 58
C. Applying the CDA: ISP Immunity from Liability for Third-
Party Content
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,59 an unidentified person
posted a message on an America Online bulletin board advertising
t-shirts for sale glorifying the April 16, 1995 bombing of the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and instructing in-
terested parties to call a person named "Ken" at Zeran's home
phone number.60 After receiving a high volume of calls, Zeran in-
formed America Online of the defamatory posting, and was told
that the message would be removed.61 Zeran later sued AOL for
unreasonable delay in removing the message, refusing to post a
retraction, and failing to screen for similar postings following the
incident.6 2 AOL successfully plead that it was immune from liabil-
ity under the CDA.6 3
On appeal, the court construed Section 230 of the CDA
broadly, stating that "[bly it's plain language, Section 230 creates a
federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service
56. See Joseph P. Zammit & Felicia Gross, Web Site Liability: Risks and Costs
of Compliance, 4 P.L.I. Ann. Internet L. Inst., Course Handbook Series, available
at 611 PLI/Pat 815, 895 (2000).
57. See id; see also Douglas B. Luffman, Defamation Liability for Online Ser-
vices: The Sky is Not Falling, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1071, 1083-85 (1997); David R.
Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications De-
cency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 147, 167-77
(1997).
58. See, e.g.,Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998); Zeran
v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937
(1998).
59. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327.
60. See id. at 328.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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providers liable for information originating with a third-party user
of the service."64 The court also noted that the CDA directly pre-
cluded an ISP such as America Online being liable as the publisher
of third-party content.65 The court regarded AOL's activities in
maintaining the bulletin board not as the role of a distributor, but
rather as a participant in the publication of third party content-
an activity which is protected under Section 230.66 The court even
went so far as to hold that, upon notice of a defamatory posting, an
ISP is "thrust into the role of a traditional publisher," because the
service provider must then determine whether or not to publish,
edit, or withdraw the posting.67 This rationale effectively prevents
an ISP distributing third-party content from ever meeting the
knowledge standard required for liability,. because once knowledge
is proven, the ISP would rise to the federally protected realm of a
publisher.68 In support of this holding, the court argued that an
interpretation of Section 230 imposing liability on ISPs with
knowledge of defamatory content would be contrary to Congress'
intent in passing the CDA, as it would deter service providers from
monitoring the content of their systems.69
One year after Zeran, a similar decision was reached in Blu-
menthal v. Drudge70 regarding the CDA's extreme limitation on
the liability faced by an ISP for third-party content posted on its
services. In Blumenthal, Sidney Blumenthal, an assistant to Pres-
ident Clinton, sued Matt Drudge, a gossip columnist, over com-
ments included in Drudge's publication, "The Drudge Report,"
suggesting that Blumenthal had a history of beating his wife.71
Blumenthal also sued America Online, which had a contract with
Drudge to make the Drudge Report available to all AOL members
for the period of one year in exchange for a monthly royalty of
$3,000.72 In the contract, America Online reserved the right to re-
move content from the Drudge Report that it reasonably deter-
64. Id. at 330.
65. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
66. See id. at 332.
67. See id.
68. See Goldstein, supra note 3.
69. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; see also Goldstein, supra note 3.
70. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
71. See id.
72. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D.D.C. 1998).
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mined violated AOL's standard terms of provider service.73 AOL
had also vigorously promoted its distribution of the Drudge Report,
characterizing Matt Drudge as a "Runaway Gossip Success."74 M-
ter Drudge formally retracted his allegations about Blumenthal,
America Online disabled access to the story on its network and re-
moved the edition of the Drudge Report from its online archives.75
In Blumenthal, the court held that Section 230 of the CDA pre-
vented AOL from being liable in tort as a publisher or distributor
of the Drudge Report:
AOL is not a passive conduit like the telephone company, a
common carrier with no control and therefore no responsibil-
ity for what is said over the telephone wires. Because it has
the fight [sic] to exercise editorial control over those with
whom it contracts and whose words it disseminates, it would
seem only fair to hold AOL to the liability standards applied
to a publisher or, at least, like a book store owner or library,
to the liability standards applied to a distributor. But Con-
gress has made a different policy choice by providing immu-
nity even where the interactive service provider has an
active, even aggressive role in making available content pre-
pared by others .. . Congress has conferred immunity from
tort liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to
self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive ma-
terial, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even
attempted.7 6
In reaching this decision, Blumenthal embraced Zeran's conclusion
that the CDA immunizes ISPs from content-based tort liability
whether or not the provider can be shown to have actual or con-
structive knowledge of improper content. 7 7
The blanket immunity the CDA furnishes Internet service
providers for third-party content is problematic. Under the hold-
ings of Zeran and Blumenthal, an ISP can escape liability for third-
party content completely, without an evaluation of the provider's
knowledge as to the content of the material, or an in-depth analy-
sis of the provider's role in transmitting the material. In Blumen-
thal, America Online had formally contracted with Drudge to
73. See id.
74. See id. at 51.
75. See id. at 47.
76. See id. at 51-52 (footnotes omitted).
77. See id. at 50 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31).
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distribute his Drudge Report and actively promoted the newsletter
as a gossip success. Rather than examining this preexisting rela-
tionship between Drudge and AOL to determine the extent of the
ISP's knowledge as to the content of the Drudge Report, the court
awarded complete immunity to America Online due to its status as
an Internet service provider. By establishing that an ISP will
never be considered a publisher of third-party content, the CDA
prevents courts from fully analyzing the nature and extent of the
provider's communications to determine liability. As a result, the
CDA establishes content immunity for all ISPs who host third-
party postings on the Internet, regardless of how this information
is transmitted, stored, or accessed by other users. 78 An analysis of
how the ISP maintains the content information on its service is
potentially important in determining the extent of the ISP's
knowledge.
The importance of these principles is illustrated by another
defamation case following the enactment of the CDA. In Lunney v.
Prodigy Services Co.,79 a teenage Boy Scout, Lunney, sued Prodigy
claiming that he had been stigmatized and defamed by a third-
party user who opened a number of Prodigy accounts under Lun-
ney's name and posted vulgar messages on Prodigy's bulletin
boards, attributing them to Lunney. 0 Prodigy monitored the con-
tent of these bulletin boards, and did in fact close down several of
the Lunney accounts due to obscene postings and inaccurate user
profile information. 8 ' These events took place prior to Congress'
enactment of the CDA, but the decision was rendered after the
CDA became law.82 Without retroactively applying the immunity
provisions of the CDA, the New York Court of Appeals held that
Prodigy was not the publisher of the statements at issue, but
rather served the function of a conduit, transmitting third-party
material without exercising editorial control over its contents. 83
78. Although immunity for third-party content is established through Section
230 for ISPs, some courts are extending this statutory immunity to other providers
of Internet services, such as online department stores. See Schneider v. Ama-
zon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming lower court's holding
that Amazon.com was a protected publisher of third-party content under Section
230 as far as its customer book reviews were concerned).
79. 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000).
80. See id. at 539-40.
81. See id. at 540.
82. See id. at 543.
83. See id.
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The court likened Prodigy's role in transmitting e-mail messages to
that of a telephone company connecting individual speakers
through electronic means, and concluded that it is not expected
that either conduit will monitor the content of its subscribers' con-
versations.8 4 Further, the court held that Prodigy's independent
acts of monitoring bulletin board postings did not alter its passive
character in providing Internet service.8 5 Thus, the court held
that Prodigy, as a mere conduit for transmitting third-party data,
was not a publisher or distributor of the material for the purposes
of tort law, and found no liability for the ISP.86
While Lunney's holding is similar to Zeran and Blumenthal in
that the court found that an ISP was not liable as the publisher or
distributor of third-party data, Lunney differs in its analysis.
Rather than regarding Prodigy's actions in transmitting third-
party e-mail messages to its bulletin board as a publication and
then resorting to the congressional safe harbor extinguishing ISP
liability for third-party content, Lunney looked instead to the ac-
tual function performed by Prodigy in transmitting these
messages. In concluding that Prodigy acted as a mere conduit
transmitting the independent content of its third-party users, the
Lunney court evaluated the function performed by the ISP in that
case. It then used this finding to determine both the ISP's role as
either a publisher or distributor of the third-party content and the
provider's knowledge of the material's content. By regarding the
ISP as a medium for transmitting data rather than a form of pub-
lishing or distribution, the Lunney court came closer to fully evalu-
ating the role of an ISP as a medium for communication.
Lunney's holding suggests that the blanket immunity provi-
sions of the CDA are not necessary for a court to hold that an ISP
is not liable as the publisher or distributor of third-party content
posted to its Internet service. Rather than resorting to complete
immunity under the CDA, a more appropriate scheme for a court
determining ISP content liability would constitute making a fac-
tual finding as to the role of the ISP in presenting the material to
the public and then using this finding to determine the extent of
the provider's knowledge and control of the third-party content.
This line of analysis would provide a technique for courts to evalu-
84. See id. at 541-42.
85. See Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 542.
86. See id.
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ate the extent of ISP liability in cases like Blumenthal, where the
role of the ISP more resembles a publisher, without resorting to a
blanket foreclosure on provider liability.
There are several different factors that are relevant in deter-
mining the role of an ISP in presenting third-party content to the
public. A court could examine the actions of the individual pro-
vider in light of traditional defamation law, and attempt to deter-
mine liability based on whether the provider acts more like a
publisher or a distributor of the statement at issue. Another possi-
bility would be to compare an ISP with another form of conduit,
like a telephone company.8 7 This comparison is not all-inclusive,
however, because it covers only one of several possible ways that
an ISP could function to transmit information to the public, some
which could arguably involve greater knowledge on the part of the
provider than others. The best comparison, as this paper will now
suggest, is to the provisions in the DMCA limiting ISP liability for
third-party copyright infringements. If these limitations were ap-
plied to defamation law in the United States as they are in Europe,
ISPs would face uniform liability for third-party acts under
OCILLA's transmission-specific safe harbors. These specific provi-
sions would also properly limit immunity to those functions of ISPs
that truly serve an innocuous function, in the realms of both copy-
right and defamation law.
II. ISP LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY ACTS OF
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Copyright owners hold, among other rights, an exclusive right
to control the reproduction, distribution, display, or performance of
their protected material.88 The U.S. Copyright Act provides that
"[alnyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owners.., is an infringer..."8 9 Subject to the recognized fair use
exception, any reproduction of a protected work constitutes copy-
right infringement, and can create liability for the infringer. 90
Three standards of liability for copyright infringement have devel-
87. See id.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
90. See Bruce P. Keller, Internet and Online Law: Copyright, 4 P.L.I. Ann.
Internet L. Inst., Course Handbook Series, available at 610 PLI/Pat 169, 201
(2000).
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oped over the years and have been discussed with regard to ISPs.91
Direct liability ensues when an individual or entity violates any
exclusive right of a copyright holder. 92 Contributory liability ap-
plies to any person who, with knowledge of the infringing activity,
"induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
of another."9 3 Vicarious liability has been held to exist when the
subject of a copyright infringement suit both exercised the right
and ability to supervise the primary infringer and had a direct fi-
nancial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.9 4
Direct and vicarious copyright infringers are subject to strict
liability for their offenses, regardless of their intent or knowledge
at the time of the violation.95 Even innocent copyright infringe-
ments are subject to strict liability under these two standards. 96
Contributory infringement, however, depends on the contributor's
actual or constructive knowledge that a copyright violation is tak-
ing place. 97 In assessing the appropriate level of liability facing an
ISP in a particular factual situation, one must look at the pro-
vider's actions to determine whether the role of the provider is one
of direct involvement in the unauthorized use. If the provider's
role is not direct, then one must consider whether the provider has
sufficient knowledge and involvement to be contributorily liable or,
alternatively, whether the provider exerts enough control and de-
rives financial benefit from the infringement so as to be vicariously
liable.98
A. Copyright Liability of ISPs Before the DMCA
The first case in the United States dealing with the subject of
online service provider liability for third-party copyright infringe-
ment was Playboy Enterprises v. Frena.99 Here, Playboy sued
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Yen, supra note 24, at 1843-44.
94. See Gershwin Publ'g, 443 F.2d at 1162; see also Yen, supra note 24, at
1843-44.
95. See Irina Y. Dmitrieva, I Know It When I See It: Should Internet Providers
Recognize Copyright Violation When They See It?, 16 Santa Clara Computer &
High Tech. L.J. 233, 235 (2000).
96. See id. at 236.
97. See id.
98. See Keller, supra note 90, at 241.
99. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
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George Frena, the operator of an online bulletin board service, for
copyright infringement, claiming that copyrighted Playboy photo-
graphs had been posted on Frena's service without authoriza-
tion. 100 Frena defended himself by claiming that the copyrighted
pictures had been uploaded to his bulletin board by individual sub-
scribers without his knowledge, and that he removed the photo-
graphs as soon as he received notification from Playboy. 1° 1 The
court found that the pictures in question were in fact the copy-
righted property of Playboy, and that in some instances these copy-
righted photographs had been displayed in an altered form on
Frena's service, such that Playboy's trademarks were replaced
with Frena's own advertisements.' 0 2 From this promotional alter-
ation, the court concluded that Frena had produced a "product"
containing infringing material, and had directly violated both the
distribution and display rights that were reserved to Playboy.' 0 3
Further, the court disregarded Frena's lack of knowledge defense,
holding Frena strictly liable for the infringement. 10 4
Two years after Frena was decided, another court evaluated
the liability of bulletin board operators and Internet service prov-
iders for third-party acts of infringement. In Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,105 the
Church of Scientology sued Dennis Erlich, a former scientologist
minister, for his unauthorized posting of copyrighted church
materials on a Usenet bulletin board.10 6 Also joined in the suit
were Kiemesrud, the bulletin board operator managing the board
Erlich used to display the messages, and Netcom, Inc., the ISP con-
necting Klemesrud's bulletin board to the Internet. 0 7 The Church
joined Netcom and Klemesrud after it notified both parties of the
infringing activities, and both the ISP and the bulletin board oper-
ator refused to remove the postings without a showing of proof that
they actually contained infringing material. 108 After reviewing
100. See id. at 1554.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1556.
103. See id.
104. See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1558.
105. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
106. See id. at 1365.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1366.
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both the Frena decision and other persuasive case law,10 9 the court
granted summary judgment in favor of Netcom and Klemesrud on
the counts of direct and vicarious liability for the alleged copyright
infringement, but sustained the contributory liability cause of ac-
tion against both parties. 110
In Netcom, the court concluded that Frena addressed a differ-
ent factual situation than the claims advanced by the Church of
Scientology. In Frena, Playboy focused its case on the unautho-
rized display and distribution of its protected photographs, and the
court found that Frena had produced a "product" violating these
rights."' The situation was different in Netcom, where the
Church claimed that Netcom and Klemesrud engaged in illegal re-
production of copyrighted material. Here, the court held that the
mere "storage on a defendant's system of infringing copies and re-
transmission to other services" does not constitute direct infringe-
ment by a bulletin board operator when the infringing information
was originally uploaded by a third-party user.112 Similarly, the
Netcom court held that an ISP, like Netcom, could not face direct
liability for third-party copyright infringement when it performs
only the function of a conduit, and does not hold files in an archive
for long periods of time.113 The court also found that while the
Church did allege a genuine issue of fact regarding Netcom's con-
trol over the postings placed on its bulletin boards, the Church did
not offer significant proof that the ISP incurred a financial benefit
from the infringing activities. 114 Thus, the court did not sustain
the Church's claim against Netcom for vicarious liability.1 s
The Netcom court did, however, refuse to grant the motions
against both the ISP and Klemesrud for summary judgment on the
count of contributory liability. 116 The court concluded that a genu-
ine issue of fact existed as to whether the defendants had actual
knowledge of the infringing activity. Since the Church notified
Netcom and Klemesrud of the misused material before the posting
109. See id. at 1371 (discussing Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F.
Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994)).
110. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1383.
111. See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1556.
112. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1371.
113. See id. at 1372.
114. See id. at 1375, 1376-77.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 1374-75.
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was set to expire, the two defendants' failure to remove the infring-
ing statements could be construed as contributing to a known in-
fringement. 117 Thus, the court allowed this claim to proceed to
trial."
Unlike Frena, the court in Netcom held that an Internet ser-
vice provider serving only the function of a conduit for third-party
information cannot be held liable for direct copyright infringement,
because the actual reproduction was made at the hands of the in-
dependent third party rather than the ISP. Although Frena dealt
with the direct copyright liability of a bulletin board operator for
alleged third-party postings, an inference can be made that the
same liability would attach to an ISP in a similar situation.
Netcom rejected this notion, likening an ISP to a telephone com-
pany or other communications conduit, which exercises no edito-
rial control over third-party submissions, but instead merely
transmits them innocuously." s Thus, Netcom's line of reasoning
implies that an ISP cannot be held liable for direct copyright in-
fringement when the infringing activity originates with a third-
party user. As a result, Netcom and Frena suggest conflicting
standards of copyright liability for Internet service providers.
B. Legislating ISP Copyright Liability: the DMCA
Following the decisions in Frena and Netcom, scholarly opin-
ion was divided regarding the proper standard of copyright liabil-
ity that should, as a rule, be imposed on ISPs for their activities as
service providers to third parties.' 20 As mentioned previously,
holding ISPs either directly or vicariously liable for third party
copyright infringement would result in strict liability, while hold-
ing them to a contributory liability standard, as the court did in
Netcom, bases liability of the ISP's awareness of the infringing ac-
tivity.' 2 ' This debate was also an issue in Congress. In the early
1990s, the Clinton administration had organized a task force on
the National Information Infrastructure, whose purpose was re-
working copyright laws to make them conform with the new reali-
117. See id. at 1375.
118. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
119. See id. at 1370.
120. For an overview of some of the different scholarly approaches to this ques-
tion see Dmitrieva, supra note 95, at 237.
121. See text supra; see also Dmitrieva, supra note 95, at 237.
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ties of the emerging digital society.122 This group's report, the
White Paper on Intellectual Property and the National Informa-
tion Infrastructure, 123 recommended that ISPs be treated as dis-
tributors under copyright law, and that they should be held to a
strict liability standard for their users' acts of infringement. 124
Further, the report did not recommend any modifications in copy-
right law to limit ISP liability. 125
The White Paper met with resistance from ISPs, who argued
that such a strict liability standard would expose them to unrea-
sonable liability for third-party acts, and would require ISPs to
monitor their systems. 126 ISPs also claimed that it would be im-
possible to catch all copyright violations through monitoring,127
and that extensive monitoring would produce a chilling effect on
free speech. 128 Internet providers preferred an actual knowledge
standard, whereby they would face liability for third-party copy-
right infringement only in cases where a provider knew of the in-
fringement and took no action to remove it promptly. 129 In
contrast, copyright owners argued that a strict liability standard
was appropriate for ISPs, and was the only way to adequately pro-
tect owners' rights.' 30 Copyright holders directly opposed an ac-
tual knowledge standard, arguing that it would remove any
incentive for an ISP to monitor its system, rewarding ignorance
with limited liability.' 3 '
While the Congressional debate over copyright liability for
ISPs continued, the United States became a party to two World
122. Info. Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National In-
formation Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (Bruce Lehman ed., 1995).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 212.
125. See id.
126. See NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearing on S.1284 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 38 (1996); see also Dmitrieva, supra
note 95, at 245.
127. See NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 104th Cong., 17 (1995).
128. See id.
129. See Dmitrieva, supra note 95, at 235.
130. See NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 104th Cong., 35 (1995).
131. See id. at 20.
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Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)13 2 Treaties, created in
Geneva during December, 1996.133 These treaties were interna-
tional in scope, and were intended to apply the regulatory provi-
sions of the Berne Convention to the new digital environment.13 '
While the WIPO treaties suggested that copyright liability should
not apply to a person or entity serving as a conduit, who "provi[des]
... physical facilities for enabling or making a communication," 135
the treaties did not specifically suggest a standard of liability for
ISPs, leaving this question for the individual countries to
decide. l3 6
Following the WIPO treaties, Congressional debate resumed
to create a bill that would enact the treaties' provisions and ade-
quately address other copyright concerns, such as the proper stan-
dard of liability for ISPs. After several months of Congressional
debate, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA),137 which incorporated an industry agreement between
ISPs and copyright holders with an earlier bill intended to codify
the court's decision in Netcom and overturn Frena. 138 In enacting
the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act
(OCILLA), s39 Title II of the DMCA, Congress intended to balance
the actual knowledge standard advocated by ISPs with the strict
liability standard advocated by rights holders by adopting an inter-
132. See WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty: Message from the President of the United States, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 105-17 (1997).
133. See id.
134. See Mihdly Ficsor, Towards a Global Solution: The Digital Agenda of the
Berne Protocol and the New Instrument, in The Future of Copyright in a Digital
Environment 111-37 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz, ed., (1996)).
135. See Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO
Doc. No. CRNR/DC/96 (Adopted Dec. 20, 1996).
136. See id.
137. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1332 (Supp. IV 1998).
138. When Representative Coble introduced House Bill 3209, he included in his
introductory remarks that he intended to codify the court's decision in Netcom, so
far as it established liability standards for ISPs, and wished to overturn the hold-
ing of Frena, "inasmuch as that case might apply to service providers, suggesting
that such acts could constitute direct infringement." See 144 Cong. Rec E160-01
(daily ed. Feb. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Coble); see also Frena, 839 F. Supp.
1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding a bulletin board operator strictly liable for third
party acts of infringement when he did not have actual or constructive knowledge
of the posted infringement and removed the material immediately once notified).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV 1998).
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mediate standard of knowledge. 140 This "intermediate" standard
of knowledge imposed ISP liability both in instances where the
provider had actual knowledge of the third-party infringement,
and where constructive knowledge could be inferred from an ISP's
awareness of "facts or circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent."141 This is more stringent than the pre-existing
knowledge standard for contributory infringement, which imposed
liability if the party knew or should have known that the material
was infringing. 142
OCILLA establishes new parameters both defining and limit-
ing the liability that Internet service providers face for third-party
acts of copyright infringement on their services. By definition,
OCILLA applies to both traditional ISPs and nonprofit institutions
of higher education in their capacity as Internet service providers
to students and faculty. 143 The provisions of OCILLA offer ISPs
affirmative defenses whereby they can escape liability for third-
party acts of copyright infringement, whether facing direct, vicari-
ous, or contributory liability. 144 These safe harbor defenses are
briefly described in the sections that follow.
DIRECT LIABILITY
Passive Conduit
OCILLA offers a safe harbor for service providers who perform
only the function of a "conduit," merely transmitting, routing, or
providing connections for the digital communications of others. 145
This provision recognizes the similarity between ISPs and "passive
140. See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, and Online Copyright
Liability Limitation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2280 Before the House Subcomm. On
Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 82
(1997).
141. Id.
142. The new knowledge standard has been defined as a "red flag" test. Accord-
ing to the House Judiciary Committee, a red flag constitutes "information of any
kind that a reasonable person would rely upon" in determining that material is
infringing. See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Online Copy-
right Infringement Liability Limitation: Report on H.R. 2281 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 25 (1998). For a discussion of the
new knowledge standard and how it should be applied with reverence to the appro-
priate legislative intent see Dmitrieva, supra note 95, at 251, 253-61.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
144. See id.
145. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1-5) (Supp. IV 1998).
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carriers" which were originally exempt under the Copyright Act, as
they do not exercise control over the contents of their clientele. 146
In order to take advantage of this safe harbor, a provider must not
initiate, select, or modify the content of the communication-
meaning that providers must not determine the message's recipi-
ents or maintain a copy of the transmission on its service in such a
manner that it can be accessed by others for a longer period than is
reasonably necessary for the transmission to take place. 147
System Caching
OCILLA offers a safe harbor to ISPs for the necessary function
of system caching, a technical procedure whereby the ISP makes a
temporary copy of information while transmitting it online.148 To
qualify for this defense, an ISP must meet the following conditions:
no modification of the material's content; regular updating of the
material in accordance with technical standards; no interference
with the ability of technology to return certain data to the original
site; and no circumvention of password mechanisms. 149 The ISP
must also expeditiously remove the material alleged to be infring-
ing upon notification from a copyright owner. 150
VICARIOUS OR CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
Information Residing on a System or Network at the Direction
of Users
OCILLA limits the liability of an ISP that stores third-party
content that is completely under the control of that user.151 This
safe harbor is contingent on the intermediate knowledge standard:
the ISP must not have actual knowledge that the material or activ-
ity is infringing, must not be aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent, and must not financially
benefit from the infringing activity. 52 This defense also requires
146. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 111(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that activities of
passive carriers should be limited to "providing wires, cables, or other communica-
tions channels for the use of others").
147. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)(1-5).
148. See id. § 512 (b)(2).
149. See id.
150. See id. § 512 (b)(2)(E).
151. See id. § 512 (c).
152. 17 U.S.C. at § 512 (c)(1)(ii) and (d)(1)(B).
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the ISP to expeditiously remove or disable access to any infringing
material either upon notification of a rights holder or upon gaining
awareness of the prohibited activity. 153
Information Location Tools
OCILLA also offers a similar safe harbor for ISPs that provide
information location tools, such as search engines, that link users
to other web sites indiscriminately.15 4 This defense is also limited
by the intermediate knowledge standard, and includes the re-
quired notice and take down provisions mentioned above.155
To be eligible for these liability limitations, ISPs are required
under OCILLA to designate an agent to receive notifications of cop-
yright violations of their networks 56 and must implement a policy
for the termination of subscribers' accounts who repeatedly act in
violation of copyright law.157
The safe harbor provisions limiting ISP copyright liability are
directly related to specific functions performed by Internet provid-
ers, and protect ISPs from liability only for the innocuous trans-
mission, copying, hosting, or linking of third-party content
materials that the provider does not itself create or control. These
liability limitations are specific, and better assess the role of the
Internet provider in infringing conduct than does the blanket im-
munity for content provided by the CDA. The limiting provisions
listed in OCILLA reflect the careful scrutiny of Congressional de-
bate and lobbying on the part of both copyright owners and In-
ternet service providers.
As a result of this lengthy process, the safe harbors outlined in
OCILLA have served as a model for other countries to follow in
codifying copyright limitations on ISP liability. OCILLA's limiting
provisions have not, however, been restricted to defining the limi-
tations on copyright liability in other countries. This paper will
now address the horizontal approach to ISP liability currently be-
ing implemented in the European Union. This approach applies
safe harbors almost identical to those in OCILLA to all forms of
potential ISP liability, creating a uniform, predictable minimum
153. See id.
154. See id. § 512 (d).
155. See id. § 512(b)(2).
156. See id. § 512 (c)(2).
157. See id. § 512(I)(1)(A).
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standard for each of the member states to follow in enacting their
own provisions.
III. ISP LIABILITY UNDER THE EU E-COMMERCE DIRECTIVE
The European Union E-Commerce Directive'5" outlines a list
of ISP safe harbors almost identical to OCILLA's provisions limit-
ing copyright liability of Internet providers for third-party acts of
infringement in the United States. 159 A significant difference in
the application of these two "statutory" provisions is the compara-
tive breadth of the safe harbor provisions. Unlike OCILLA's limit-
ing provisions, which provide safe harbors for Internet providers
only under copyright law,160 the EU Directive will apply across the
board to all areas of law involving ISPs.161 This creates a unified,
"horizontal" approach to determining the extent of Internet pro-
vider liability in Europe, and avoids the uncertainty of having dif-
ferent legal standards for determining when ISPs face potential
liability.162
The E-Commerce Directive will significantly change the laws
of countries that have not independently developed statutory pro-
visions limiting ISP liability163 or have adopted them, but have,
like the United States, made the provisions particular to one area
of law. 164 By employing a horizontal approach to the issue of pro-
158. See Council Directive 00/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178).
159. One aspect in which the E-Commerce Directive and OCILLA's limiting
provisions differ is the Directive's lack of a comparable safe harbor for ISPs func-
tioning as information location tools. Article 24 of the Directive includes a re-ex-
amination procedure whereby the European Commission can re-evaluate the
importance of including a liability limitation for ISPs providing these linking ser-
vices within three years of the Directive's adoption. Some scholars have hypothe-
sized that during this time a separate safe harbor for information location tools
will be added to the Directive. See Julia-Barcelo, supra note 11, at 115; Claus
Kdhler & Kai Burmeister, Copyright Liability on the Internet Today in Europe
(Germany, France, Italy and the E. U.), 1999 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 21(10) 485-99,
499.
160. See Dmitrieva, supra note 95, at 240.
161. See Julia-Barcelo, supra note 11, at 108.
162. See id; see also Andre Lucas, Exploitation and Liability in the Light of
Media Coverage, 2001 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 23(6), 275, 275 (discussing the hori-
zontal approach of the EU E-Commerce Directive and relating some of its advan-
tages and disadvantages).
163. See Kohler & Burmeister, supra note 159, at 497-98 (discussing the lack of
existing ISP liability limitations in France and Italy).
164. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd., 1999 WL 477647 (Q.B. Mar. 26,
1999) (applying the U.K. Defamation Act of 1996). This Act imposes a variety of
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vider liability, the European Commission hopes to ensure predict-
ability for ISPs and promote harmonization between the various
member states who must use the Directive as a minimum standard
for enacting their own legislation. As Julia-Barcelo165 argues, this
approach also eliminates the need for self-monitoring:
A horizontal approach is appropriate... because the informa-
tion that travels through on-line intermediary facilities such
as cables, satellites and servers is just a sequence of bits, a
succession of zeros and ones which is not linked to the real
meaning of the information itself. Therefore, to apply differ-
ent legal standards to different material flowing over their
systems, on-line intermediaries would actually have to con-
vert all those zeros and ones into text, music and images, and
monitor and review each piece of such information. Imposing
such an obligation on on-line intermediaries would bring the
Internet to a halt and would threaten the privacy of informa-
tion moving over it.'66
Julia-Barcelo's comments highlight a valid concern with verti-
cally applied ISP liability. For the American dual-standard liabil-
ity scheme to properly enforce Congress' stated intent in passing
both Acts, 16 7 American Internet service providers must, in some
form or fashion, monitor third-party content posted to their sys-
tems. 168 It is this self-policing privilege that Congress sought to
protect by limiting provider liability for third-party content in the
CDA.169 Congress also advanced this goal by limiting provider lia-
bility for removing any third-party material that either the pro-
vider or other users found offensive. 170 While this liability
limitation does enable ISPs to freely monitor and police their sys-
tems, it does not require any such activity on their part.171 As a
limited liabilities for ISPs, provided that they lack knowledge of third party con-
tent and exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The law does not regu-
late copyright liability of ISPs. See id.
165. See Julia-Barcelo, supra note 11.
166. Id. at 108.
167. See supra. text; see also 144 Cong. Rec E160-01 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Coble); Joint Explanatory Statement of the Congressional Con-
ference Committee, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See supra. text; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
171. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Congressional Conference Com-
mittee, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
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result, under the current interpretation of the CDA, a provider
gains the benefit of complete immunity without upholding any
level of requisite responsibility, even when actual or constructive
knowledge of the problematic content is arguable. 172
While still not requiring monitoring, 173 OCILLA's limiting
provisions create liability for an Internet provider where the ISP
meets one of three requirements: actual knowledge of a user's in-
fringement,' 74 awareness of facts or circumstances from which the
infringement is apparent, or receipt of a financial benefit from the
user's infringing activity. 175 If any of these provisions are met, an
ISP can still avoid liability under OCILLA by promptly removing
the questionable material upon notice of the possible infringe-
ment.17 6 The EU E-Commerce Directive applies similar safe har-
bor provisions horizontally to define the level of liability ISPs face
throughout all areas of law, including defamation. 177 Thus, the E-
Commerce Directive avoids content monitoring concerns not by
granting wholesale immunity of the kind provided by the CDA, but
rather by analyzing the facts of each case to determine whether the
ISP gains liability limitation by fitting into the listed safe harbors.
Where third-party content is concerned, this evaluation will focus
on the amount of editorial control the ISP exercised, the level of
knowledge it possessed, and the financial benefit it gained. This
method for determining ISP liability seems more in line with the
requirement in common defamation law of determining based on
172. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31.
173. See DMCA Report on S. 2037 of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Rept.
105-190, 105th Cong. (1998).
174. See text supra. See also supra notes 138-52 and accompanying text.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. One difference in the respective safe harbors provided by OCILLA and the
E-Commerce Directive is the adoption of a "notice and take down" requirement as
a prerequisite for obtaining safe harbor immunity. While OCILLA statutorily re-
quires that potentially infringing material be promptly removed by an ISP after
notification, the E-Commerce Directive includes no such per se requirement. See
P. Brent Hugenholtz, Caching and Copyright: The Right of Temporary Copying,
2000 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 22(10) 482, 492. However, failure to expeditiously re-
move infringing material after notification can still result in liability if a court
finds, applying underlying general principles of the respective country's law, that
the ISP had actual notice of infringement on their system and failed to take rea-
sonable steps to remedy the situation. See id.; see, e.g., Godfrey, 1999 WL 477647
(discussed at length in text infra).
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the facts of the case whether or not a person or entity acts as a
publisher or distributor of a defamatory statement.
While safe harbor provisions employed by the EU E-Com-
merce Directive and OCILLA offer a more evaluative look at the
activities engaged in by Internet providers for determining pro-
vider liability in a defamation context, there remains one aspect of
OCILLA that conflicts with another fimdamental characteristic of
U.S. defamation law. These conflicting provisions are the "notice
and take-down" provisions statutorily created through OCILLA
and the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment.178
IV. ISP LIABILITY UNDER OCILLA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
To retain OCILLA's safe harbor provision limiting ISP liability
for third-party information posted on its service, an Internet pro-
vider must promptly remove any allegedly infringing material
upon notification by a copyright owner.'7 9 This feature of OCILLA
arguably impedes the First Amendment right to free speech, be-
cause the Act in effect requires an ISP to remove or block access to
information upon a mere allegation of infringement, without a re-
quired showing that an infringement has indeed occurred. As Al-
fred Yen argued, OCILLA's notice and take-down provisions could
have First Amendment implications even in a copyright context:
... [Tihe ambiguity of copyright law will make it impossible
to determine accurately whether many potential infringe-
ments are, in fact, infringement... even if the subscriber's
behavior appears to be infringing, the ISP has no way of relia-
bly knowing whether the subscriber has permission for the
use or the copyright holder in question objects.
These problems place ISPs in a quandary. If they monitor
their networks, they will undoubtedly stumble across potential in-
fringements, but they also will be forced to decide whether to re-
move those potential infringements without secure knowledge of
whether such removal is appropriate. Like risk averse newspaper
publishers, ISPs faced with this dilemma will likely resolve any
178. While freedom of speech is a fundamental concern in Europe as well as in
the United States, U.S. defamation law is subject to heightened scrutiny because it
must comply with the First Amendment to the Constitution. The First Amend-
ment reads, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the free-
dom of speech. . ." U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 2.
179. See id.
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such doubts they have in favor of removing the material in ques-
tion from the Internet because such action minimizes claims of in-
fringement. Such behavior, however, implies resolving doubts
about the silencing of speech against speech.180
While First Amendment concerns exist in a copyright context,
they have been explored in greater detail in defamation law, where
one of the central issues in creating libel laws has been balancing
enforcement with the need to prevent any "chilling effect" on con-
stitutionally protected free speech.18 ' Arguably, imposing the no-
tice and take-down requirement outlined in OCILLA in defamation
cases now covered by the CDA would have an immediate chilling
effect on free speech, because such a provision would, in effect, re-
quire the immediate removal of information as soon as an allega-
tion as to its defamatory content was made to ensure that the ISP
retained its safe harbor for third-party postings.
In Europe, the horizontal approach of the EU E-Commerce Di-
rective addresses these notice and take-down concerns by omitting
statutory notice and take-down provisions within the text of the
Directive.' 8 2 However, it is arguable that the Directive's silent
provisions nonetheless implicitly create a notice and take-down re-
quirement for ISPs to maintain their limited liability status. Be-
cause the Directive constitutes only minimum requirements for
different member states to adopt into their own respective intellec-
tual property legal schemes, European countries are still free to
apply general legal standards to conclude that, once notice of possi-
ble infringement is perfected, any failure of an ISP to expeditiously
remove the material from the Internet results in a disqualification
of the ISP's safe harbor protection.' 8 3 Due to the horizontal appli-
cation of the Directive, this possible notice and take-down result
would apply across the board in all cases involving Internet service
providers, including both copyright and defamation.' 8 4 One case
that illustrates the impact of a possible notice and take-down re-
gime on ISP liability is the recent U.K. case, Godfrey v. Demon In-
ternet Limited.18 5
180. See Yen, supra note 24, at 1871.
181. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-81 (1964).
182. See Hugenholtz, supra note 177, at 492.
183. See id. at 492.
184. See Julia-Barcelo, supra note 11, at 108.
185. 1999 WL 477647 (Q.B. Mar. 26, 1999).
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In Godfrey, a British math, physics, and computer science lec-
turer sued Demon, a prominent Internet service provider in En-
gland and Wales, over a defamatory newsgroup posting that the
provider carried on its service.' 8 6 While the actual third-party
user who originally posted the defamatory statement remains un-
known, it was established that the posting originated in the United
States with a different ISP.'8 7 Demon's sole connection with the
statement was the fact that it carried the particular newsgroup
containing the defamatory content on its service. 18 The statement
in question was "squalid, obscene and defamatory of the plaintiff"
and purported to come from the plaintiff, although his name was
misspelled.' 8 9 When Godfrey discovered the defamatory new-
sgroup posting, he notified the managing director of Demon that
the posting was a forgery and requested that it be removed from
Demon's Use-net news server. 190 Although Demon admitted re-
ceiving the message, and could have "obliterated the posting," they
did not remove the allegedly defamatory material from their server
until it naturally expired. 191
In deciding Godfrey, the court applied the U.K. Defamation
Act of 1996,192 which, like the DMCA, provides safe harbors or
"defences" limiting ISP liability as a publisher of third-party con-
tent when the provider can show that he was not the "author, edi-
tor, or publisher" of the defamatory statement;193 that he took
"reasonable care" in relation to the statement; 94 and that he "did
not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused or
contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement."195
While the court concluded that Demon was not the actual pub-
lisher of the statement in question,196 it held that the provider was
ineligible for the liability limitation provided by the act.197 Since
Demon was notified of the defamatory statement and did nothing,
186. See id. at *2.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id. at *3.
191. See Godfrey, 1999 WL 477647 at *3.
192. See id. (quoting from the U.K. Defamation Act of 1996).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at *3.
196. See id.
197. See Godfrey, 1999 WL 477647 at *3.
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the court concluded that the ISP had failed to exercise the reasona-
ble care required by the Act.198 The court also held that Demon,
after notification by Godfrey, was in possession of sufficient infor-
mation to make the ISP aware that its actions were contributing to
the publication of a defamatory statement.199 Because the ISP did
not take affirmative action to remove the allegedly defamatory ma-
terial after Godfrey's notification, it lost the liability limitation
that the Defamation Act would have otherwise provided it.200 As a
result, the court held Demon liable for the third-party defamatory
statements posted on its service.201
Although Godfrey was not decided under the provisions recited
in the E-Commerce Directive, the Godfrey case is an example of
how strict adherence to a notice and take-down requirement can
result in chilling free speech. As Godfrey illustrates, an ISP under
this regime must remove any problematic material as soon as it
receives notice that the information is either defamatory or in-
fringing copyright law to protect itself from liability. Further, both
the Directive and OCILLA recognize liability for ISPs when the
provider should have been aware of facts or circumstances making
infringement apparent. 20 2 If the reasoning applied in Godfrey is
followed, ISPs could be held liable under these provisions for fail-
ing to remove material that appears questionable as regards copy-
right or defamation law, without any requirement that ISPs
affirmatively establish that such information is in fact unpro-
tected. Such broad removal discretion, with or without notice of
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at *7.
201. See id. In deciding Godfrey, the court cited the American defamation cases
dealing with ISP liability before the CDA, and then distinguished the court's appli-
cation of the CDA's complete content immunity for ISPs in Zeran, noting that the
British Defamation Act "did not adopt this approach or have this purpose." See
Godfrey, 1999 WL 477647 at *8. The Godfrey court also distinguished Lunney's
common law approach to limiting ISP liability by noting that under English com-
mon law Prodigy would have been regarded as the publisher of its user's third
party content rather than a passive conduit. See id. By this discussion, the God-
frey court illustrates the massive liability that British ISPs faced under common
law defamation principles, and how this liability has been significantly softened by
recent statutory provisions like the Defamation Act, which work to create safe
harbors for ISPs.
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c), (d) (Supp. IV 1998); Council Directive 2000/31IEC,
2000 O.J. (L 178); see also Julia-Barcelo, supra note 11, at 110; Kohler &
Burmeister, supra note 159, at 499.
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alleged improper content or infringement, would impede the right
of free speech for individual Internet users.
To rectify this problem while still applying the function-spe-
cific provisions of OCILLA and the E-Commerce Directive to Amer-
ican defamation law, the notice-and-take-down requirements
outlined in OCILLA could be softened in the defamation context.
One possibility for softening OCILLA's take-down requirement
would be requiring those claiming to be the victim of defamation to
approach an ISP not with an allegation of inappropriate content on
its system, but rather with a court injunction, specifying that the
speech is unprotected and should be removed from the Internet. 20 3
Since the alleged victim of defamation carries the burden of prov-
ing that the other party's speech is in fact false and defamatory in
a courtroom setting, such a showing should also be appropriate to
restrict the open forum for free speech that exists on the Internet.
Requiring such a heightened showing to sanction the removal of
material based on its content is consistent with the heightened
freedom of speech that is guaranteed by the First Amendment.20 4
Also, since the heightened removal standard would apply only
where content was concerned, it would not impede the privileges of
copyright owners under the Berne Convention, which establishes
that copyright owners shall not be required to actively enforce
their rights of ownership to retain its privileges. 20 5
203. Several scholars discussing the reality of a horizontal application of ISP
safe harbors have endorsed the need for a court to weigh the competing interests of
the victims of defamation against those of Internet operators before resorting to
automatic removal and the resulting imposition on freedom of expression. See Lu-
cas, supra note 162, at 278; see also Dun & Bradsreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756-61 (1985) (discussing, among other things, the need to bal-
ance the compelling state interest in enforcing defamation law against the First
Amendment's interest in allowing the free flow of speech in public debate, and how
this balance is altered by the status of the victim as a public or private figure and
the subject matter of the speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-48
(1974).
204. See U.S. Const. amend I.
205. See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, and Online Copyright
Liability Limitation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2281 and 2280 Before the House Sub-
comm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 58 (1997).
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CONCLUSION
The Internet has continually expanded over the past decade,
becoming an invaluable medium for communication on a global
level.20 6 To efficiently enforce defamation and copyright law on-
line, the liability of both individuals and Internet providers must
be easily determined and to some degree predictable. It should
also be reflective of the roles that individual users and Internet
service providers actually play in the digital world. Sometimes
ISPs exercise no control over material that they send via the In-
ternet, and act only as a conduit. In other instances, the role of the
ISP is much more involved, and its knowledge of the content it pro-
duces is arguably greater. The blanket immunity that the CDA
offers Internet providers allows ISPs to act as publishers and dis-
tributors of online content without facing liability for this role.
This provision is outmoded. Defamation law can be better enforced
on the Internet by employing a unified set of specific safe harbor
provisions for ISPs that relate to the different aspects of their on-
line activities. Such a unified, horizontal approach to ISP liability
is being constructed effectively in Europe. 20 7 OCILLA's negotiated
provisions limiting ISP liability in the copyright context accurately
address the role of an ISP in transmitting information, and can be
adequately modified for application in a defamation context with-
out improperly chilling free speech online. Such a unified standard
will better meet the needs of users, providers, and defamation law
in the United States.
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